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In a Bayesian game, the players simultaneously choose actions as a function
of their private information (or type). This framework is useful to iden-
tify the parameters of the basic interactive decision problem but does not
account for possible nonbinding communication between the players, which
enables them to exchange information and to coordinate their actions. Such
a communication typically takes place at the interim stage (namely, once the
players know their type and before they choose an action) and is conveniently
modelled in extensions of the Bayesian game.
As illustrated by a vast literature, communication may consist of a plain
conversation between the players (￿cheap talk￿ ) or be mediated by a third
party; it may last for one or several stages or even involve no deadline (see,
e.g., Forges and Koessler (2008) for a short survey). In spite of this vari-
ety, a generalized revelation principle holds: the set of all Nash equilibrium
outcomes of all games that extend a given Bayesian game by allowing ar-
bitrary communication is nicely characterized, as the set of all ￿canonical
communication equilibria￿ . These are achieved with the help of a mediator
who ￿rst invites the players to reveal their types and then performs a lottery,
in order to privately recommend an action to each of them, as a function of
their reported types (see Forges (1986), Myerson (1986) and Myerson (1991),
chapter 6).
Canonical communication equilibria are very tractable but rely on a cen-
tralized mediator, who collects the private information of the players. A
plain conversation between the players is much more natural and preserves
the players￿privacy. Hence the question:
Can all canonical communication equilibrium outcomes be implemented by
means of cheap talk, i.e., as Nash equilibrium outcomes of an appropriately
designed extended game in which the players can talk?
Partially or even fully positive answers have been given in ￿nite Bayesian
games, in which types and actions take ￿nitely many values, as soon as the
number of players is at least three1. However, for two players, the answer
is in general negative. Consider for instance the particular case where every
player has a single type (complete information); in a plain conversation,
both players know all the messages that they exchange, hence they cannot
1Game theoretical references involve, e.g., BÆrÆny (1992), Forges (1990b), Ben Porath
(1998, 2003, 2006) and Gerardi (2004). See, e.g., Halpern (2008) for references in computer
science.
2simulate the private recommendations of a mediator. More precisely, in a bi-
matrix game, communication equilibria coincide with Aumann (1974, 1987)￿ s
correlated equilibria, while the set of Nash equilibrium outcomes of a cheap
talk extension of the game is always included in the convex hull of the set of
Nash equilibrium outcomes of the bi-matrix game.
As a very di⁄erent particular case, consider a two-person (￿nite) Bayesian
game with a single informed player, whose actions are not payo⁄ relevant,
and a decision maker. In the original Bayesian game, the players choose
their actions simultaneously so that the informed player cannot transmit
information to the decision maker. Allowing a single stage of cheap talk,
from the informed player to the decision maker, transforms the game into a
sender-receiver game2. Examples show that, in that framework, there may
exist communication equilibrium outcomes which cannot be achieved as Nash
equilibrium outcomes of the sender-receiver game (see, e.g., Forges (1985)3).
Even more, some communication equilibrium outcomes cannot even be im-
plemented by ￿long cheap talk￿ , in which both players exchange costless
messages for as many stages as they like (see Forges (1990a)4).
Should the previous negative results lead us to forget about implementing
communication equilibrium outcomes by cheap talk in two-person Bayesian
games? Of course, no: two-person games are the prototype of interactive
decision problems, as illustrated by the most popular game theoretical ex-
amples. But the above counter-examples teach us that, to implement all
communication equilibrium outcomes of a two-person game, we have to re-
lax the notion of cheap talk in some way. For instance, Dodis, Halevy and
2Sender-receiver games were ￿rst studied by Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Green and
Stokey (2007). Their model involves types and actions in a real interval and thus does not
pertain to the ￿nite setup that will be adopted in this paper.
3The framework in Forges (1985) is an in￿nitely repeated game but the results are easily
reformulated in one-shot games with cheap talk (see exercise 6.9 in Myerson (1991)).
Krishna and Morgan (2004) show that three stages of cheap talk enable the players to
Pareto improve on Crawford and Sobel (1982)￿ s Nash equilibria. Goltsman et al. (2009)
strengthen this result by proving that, if the con￿ ict of interest between the sender and
the receiver is not too large, the latter equilibria are optimal communication equilibria.
They further show that ￿nitely many stages of cheap talk cannot replicate mediation when
the con￿ ict of interest gets larger.
4The example in Forges (1990a) explicitly deals with long cheap talk before a single
decision stage, but relies on techniques developed by Hart (1985) and Aumann and Hart
(1986) for in￿nitely repeated games with incomplete information. Aumann and Hart (2003)
use this approach to characterize all Nash equilibrium outcomes of any long cheap talk
game with a single informed player.
3Rabin (2000) and Urbano and Vila (2002) rely on cryptographic tools devel-
oped in computer science, namely assume that the computational ability of
the players is limited. Under this assumption, they show that the correlated
equilibrium outcomes of any two-person game with complete information can
indeed be implemented as (￿￿) Nash equilibrium outcomes of a cheap talk
extension of the game. Ben-Porath (1998) obtains a similar result by allow-
ing the players not only to talk but also to make use of urns or envelopes.
Generalizations to games with incomplete information have been proposed
by R.V. Krishna (2007) and Izmalkov, Lepinski and Micali (2010) for the
latter approach and by Urbano and Vila (2004) for the cryptographic one.
The common feature of these solutions is that cheap talk is relaxed at every
stage.
In this paper, we follow another avenue and maintain the standard no-
tion of cheap talk, in which the players just exchange possibly simultaneous,
costless, messages at every stage. They are not imposed any deadline but
cannot use any common device (like urns, envelopes or recording machines)
while they talk (but each player is of course free to use any personal device to
make his own choices). However, we assume that, before they start to talk,
the players can privately observe some signal, a sunspot, which is totally
extraneous to the game (i.e., independent of the players￿types and without
any direct e⁄ect on the payo⁄s)5. Following Aumann (1974, 1987), the play-
ers￿signals can be correlated and the set of all Nash equilibrium outcomes
of the extended game in which the players ￿rst observe their signal has a
tractable canonical representation. In our framework, the canonical signal of
each player takes the form of a recommendation on how to talk and how to
make a decision at the end of the cheap talk phase.
In other words, we consider strategic form correlated equilibria (in the
sense of Aumann (1974, 1987)) of a long cheap talk game extending the
original Bayesian game. Our main result can be stated as follows. Fix any
two-person Bayesian game ￿ and any communication equilibrium outcome
of ￿; we design a long cheap talk extension ext￿ of ￿, with ￿nitely many
messages at every stage, together with a correlation device for the cheap talk
game ext￿, with the following properties: (i) no player can gain by unilat-
erally deviating from the recommendation of the correlation device in ext￿
5As in Forges (1988), we do not reserve the term ￿sunspot￿ to a common, public,
extraneous signal. The interpretation is that every player observes the sunspots in his
own way.
4and (ii) the outcome, namely the conditional probability distributions gen-
erated by the correlation device and strategies in ext￿ over actions given
types, are exactly the same as in the communication equilibrium. In this
construction, the size of the ￿nite set of messages depends on the parameters
of the Bayesian game and on the underlying communication equilibrium. By
considering a countable set of messages, we can get at once all communica-
tion equilibrium outcomes of any Bayesian game as correlated equilibrium
outcomes of a universal cheap talk game, as in Forges (1990b) for games
with at least four players6. Our cheap talk game ext￿ is possibly in￿nitely
long in the sense that its length is not ￿xed in advance, in a deterministic
way, but depends endogenously on the messages exchanged by the players.
Nevertheless, at the equilibrium that we construct, cheap talk ends up almost
surely in ￿nitely many stages.
Our result extends Forges (1985), which focuses on the case of a single
informed player and a single decision maker. One stage of cheap talk suf-
￿ces then to implement all communication equilibrium outcomes. Recently,
Blume (2010) established a similar result in the context of Crawford and So-
bel (1982)￿ s sender-receiver game. Forges (1985)￿ s construction goes through
if payo⁄ relevant actions are added for the single informed player. However,
the general case, where both players are privately informed and make deci-
sions, remained open until Vida (2006) proposed a ￿rst solution7.
When trying to implement a given communication equilibrium by cheap
talk in a two-person game in which both players have private information and
must take actions, the main problem is to guarantee that no player learns
useful information before the other. Full detection of possible deviations dur-
ing the cheap talk phase can be of no help if it happens too late. Indeed,
there may be no way to ￿punish￿a deviator once he possesses the desired
information. In order to solve the problem, the basic idea is that the correla-
tion device selects a relevant stage t￿ of the cheap talk phase, without telling
it directly to the players. How will the players ￿gure out when they reach it?
At the end of every stage t of cheap talk, they simultaneously discover from
their exchanged messages whether stage t was relevant (i.e., t = t￿) or not.
Useful information is only exchanged at the relevant stage t￿, but the players
6Forges (1990b) also proposes a cheap talk game with a continuum of messages which
is universal for all three person games.
7The main result in this paper can already be found in Vida (2006)￿ s unpublished
doctoral dissertation (see also Vida (2007a)). The proof proposed in this paper is a sim-
pli￿cation of the original one.
5realize this at the end of the stage. In addition, at every stage, each player
can check whether the other￿ s message was legitimate or not. If the stage
is not relevant, the players￿information is not updated so that illegitimate
messages can give rise to punishments.
We implement communication equilibria of a given Bayesian game as
correlated equilibria of the game preceded by cheap talk. Hence we replace
the communication device by a correlation device, that is to say, a mediator
by another! What do we really gain from our construction? As argued by
Forges (1985, 1988, 1990b) and recently by Blume (2010), the mediators
implicitly involved in the two solution concepts are very di⁄erent from each
other. In a (canonical) communication equilibrium of the original game, the
mediator gets to know the whole information of every player. However, in a
correlated equilibrium of the cheap talk game, the mediator does not receive
any information from the players. He makes recommendations on how to
exchange messages but remains fully ignorant of the players￿types. With
such a mediator, players can preserve their privacy.
Let us turn to the organization of the paper. In the next section, we
recall the concepts of Bayesian game and communication equilibrium. Then,
in section 3, we describe the extension of the game in which the players can
talk and we de￿ne correlated equilibrium in that game. The main result (i.e.,
every communication equilibrium of a Bayesian game can be implemented as
a correlated equilibrium of the extension of the game) is formally stated in
section 4; the reader familiar with our basic concepts can go to the statement
right away. Section 5 illustrates that long cheap talk is necessary to our re-
sult: we provide an example in which a communication equilibrium outcome
cannot be achieved as a correlated equilibrium outcome, in any cheap talk
game with a bounded number of stages. Section 6 contains the proof of the
main result. Finally, section 7 discusses some variants of the model.
2 Basic game, communication equilibrium
Let us ￿x a two-player ￿nite Bayesian game ￿ ￿ < fLi;Ai;gigi=1;2 ;p >: for
every player i = 1;2, Li is a ￿nite set of possible types, Ai is a ￿nite set of
actions and gi : L ￿ A ! R is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function,
where L = L1 ￿ L2 and A = A1 ￿ A2; p 2 ￿L is the players￿common prior
over L.
￿ starts with a move of nature, which selects l = (l1;l2) 2 L according
6to p; player i is only informed of his own type li, i = 1;2. Then the players
simultaneously choose actions a1 2 A1 and a2 2 A2, respectively; let a =
(a1;a2). The respective payo⁄s are g1(l;a) and g2(l;a).
A (canonical) communication device8 q for ￿ is a transition probability
from L to A, q : L ! ￿A, namely a system of probability distributions q(:jl)
over A for every l 2 L. By adding a communication device q to the Bayesian
game, one generates an extended game ￿q, which is played as follows:
1. Every player i learns his type li as in ￿, i = 1;2.
2. Every player i sends a private message ^ li 2 Li to the communication
device q; let ^ l = (^ l1;^ l2).
3. q selects an action pro￿le a = (a1;a2) with probability q(aj^ l).
4. q sends ai privately to player i, i = 1;2.
5. The players choose actions and receive payo⁄s as in ￿.
Some strategies are of special interest in ￿q: player i is sincere in ￿q if he
reveals his type to the communication device at stage 2, namely ^ li = li for
every li 2 Li; player i is obedient if at stage 5, he follows the recommendation
ai made by the communication device at stage 4, whathever his type. When



















i;i = 1;2: (1)
Let G[q] = (Gi[qjli])li2Li;i=1;2 be the pair of vector payo⁄s associated with q.
De￿nition 1 Let q be a (canonical) communication device for ￿. q is a
(canonical) communication equilibrium of ￿ if and only if the sincere and






















for i = 1;2;li;^ li 2 Li and for all ri : Ai ! Ai.
8See Forges (1986, 1990b) and Myerson (1986, 1991).
9When the index i refers to one of the two players, ￿i refers to the other one.
7Let ME(￿) be the set of communication equilibrium10 payo⁄s of ￿, namely
ME(￿) = fG[q]jq is a communication equilibrium in ￿g ￿ R
jL1￿L2j.
Thanks to the general revelation principle recalled in the introduction (see,
e.g., Forges (1990b)), ME(￿) is the set of all payo⁄s that can be achieved
at a Nash equilibrium of an arbitrary extension of ￿ allowing the players to
communicate (possibly with in￿nitely many stages and relying on a mediator
at every stage).
De￿nition 2 A payo⁄ vector (xi(li))li2Li 2 RjLij is (strictly) interim in-
dividually rational for player i = 1;2 (or interim supportable with (strict)
punishment) in ￿ if there is a strategy of the other player in ￿, namely, a
transition probability y￿i : L￿i ! ￿A￿i, such that for all li 2 Li,
x
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Let (S)INTIR(￿) be the set of vectors in RjL1￿L2j that are (strictly)
interim individually rational for both players. Observe that, in general,
(S)INTIR(￿) depends on the prior probability distribution p in ￿.
In games with complete information (i.e., when jL1j = jL2j = 1), the
de￿nition reduces to the standard one, namely xi is (strictly) individually
rational for player i i⁄
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The following lemma, which will be used later, states that interim indi-
vidual rationality always holds at a communication equilibrium.
Lemma 1 ME(￿) ￿ INTIR(￿).
Proof
Let q be a communication equilibrium and li 2 Li be a type of player i;




















































Hence one can set y￿i(a￿ijl￿i) = q(a￿ij^ li;l￿i) for some ^ li 2 Li as punishment.￿
Observe that, in the previous proof, ￿punishment￿is mostly a convenient
terminology. More precisely, consider the following strategy of player i in ￿q:
at stage 2, he reports type ^ li whatever his type; at stage 5., he plays an arbi-
trary action bi, independently of the recommendation of the communication
device. This strategy of player i can be interpreted as ￿non-participation￿ .
If player j = ￿i plays the strategy y￿i in the previous proof, player i￿ s payo⁄
is the same as when he does not participate.
3 Cheap talk game, correlated equilibrium
In this section, we ￿rst extend the basic game ￿ ￿ < fLi;Ai;gigi=1;2 ;p > by
means of a long cheap talk phase; then we de￿ne correlated equilibria in this
extended game.
Let M be a ￿nite set of messages; let c (￿continue￿ ) and s (￿stop￿ ) be
two additional messages available to the players. We de￿ne the multistage
game extM￿ as follows:
Stage 0: every player i learns his type li as in ￿, i = 1;2.
Stage 1: the players simultaneously send the message c or s to each other. If
they both selected c, they simultaneously send a message in M to each
other and they proceed to stage 2. Otherwise, every player i chooses
an action in Ai, payo⁄s are given as in ￿, the game stops.
Stage t (t = 2;3;:::): if the game has not stopped at an earlier stage, the
players simultaneously send the message c or s to each other. If they
both selected c, they simultaneously send a message in M to each other
and they proceed to stage t + 1. Otherwise, every player i chooses an
action in Ai, payo⁄s are given as in ￿, the game stops.
9The previous scenario fully describes the players￿possible moves in the
game extM￿, and the payo⁄s if the moves make the game stop at some stage
t. The scenario also allows the game to go on forever, which is unavoidable if
the length of communication is not ￿xed in advance (see, e.g., Forges (1990a),
Gossner and Vieille (2001), Aumann and Hart (2003)). We thus have to de￿ne
the payo⁄s in the case of in￿nitely long cheap talk, even if this event will
typically be out of the equilibrium path. Since there is no particular outcome
to be identi￿ed in our general Bayesian game, we assume, as Gossner and
Vieille (2001) and Aumann and Hart (2003), that, if communication goes on
forever, the players make their decisions ￿at in￿nity￿ .
Let Ht = (M ￿ M)t￿1, t = 1;2;:::, be the set of all pairs of messages in
M possibly sent before stage t and let H1 = (M ￿ M)N. We provide these
sets with a measurable structure, in the standard way: let Ht be the algebra
over H1 generated by cylinder sets of the form ht￿1 ￿ H1, where ht￿1 is a
sequence in Ht. Let H1 be the ￿-algebra over H1 generated by the algebras
Ht;t = 1;2;:::
A pure strategy ￿i for player i (i = 1;2) in extM￿ is a sequence of









i ￿ Ht ! fc;sg; m
i
t : L




i ￿ Ht ! A
i; t = 1;2;::: d
i
1 : L
i ￿ H1 ! A
i
These mappings are interpreted as follows: ￿
i
t describes player i￿ s decision
to continue or stop at stage t if the game is still going on at that stage,
mi
t describes which message in M he sends if both players have decided to
continue at stage t, di
t describes the action he chooses if at least one of the
players has decided to stop at stage t; di
1 describes the action he chooses if
communication goes on forever.
Let ￿ = (￿1;￿2) be a pair of pure strategies in extM￿ and let l = (l1;l2)
be a pair of types chosen at stage 0. If, for these types l, ￿ induces the game
to stop at stage t, namely if ￿ leads one of the player to choose s at stage
t, as a function of the past history, then the payo⁄s associated with l and ￿
are computed using the mappings di
t and the utility functions gi. If for these
types l, ￿ induces cheap talk to last forever, the payo⁄s associated with l and
￿ are computed in a similar way, using the mappings di
1. Payo⁄s in extM￿
are thus well-de￿ned and the de￿nition of the game is complete.
As explained in the introduction, the players cannot hope to implement
all communication equilibrium outcomes of ￿ by cheap talk, namely as equi-
10librium outcomes of extM￿ for some set of messages M, without randomizing
their strategies in a correlated way.
A correlation device consists of a probability space (￿;B;￿), together
with sub-￿-algebras B1 and B2 of B. (￿;B;￿) represents extraneous events
(￿sunspots￿ ), which happen independently of ￿ (and extM￿), in particular
independently of the types in L; Bi, i = 1;2, represents player i￿ s private
information on the extraneous events. In order to achieve our implementation
goal, we shall only make use of simple and well-behaved correlation devices,
typically describing discrete random variables.
By adding a correlation device [(￿;B;￿);B1;B2] to extM￿, we get a new
extended game, (extM￿)￿, in which before stage 1 of extM￿, every player
i gets private information in Bi on an extraneous event, selected in (￿;B)
according to ￿. This lottery can take place before or after stage 0, but is
independent of the players￿prior p. In (extM￿)￿, every player i makes his
strategic choices as a function of his extraneous information, described by
Bi (i = 1;2). Proceeding as in Aumann and Hart (2003), a pure strategy











i ￿ Ht ￿ ￿ ! fc;sg; m
i
t : L




i ￿ Ht ￿ ￿ ! A
i; t = 1;2;::: d
i
1 : L
i ￿ H1 ￿ ￿ ! A
i
De￿nition 3 A correlated equilibrium of extM￿ is a Nash equilibrium of
(extM￿)￿, for some correlation device [(￿;B;￿);B1;B2].
The prior probability distribution p over L, the probability distribution ￿
of a correlation device and strategies (￿1;￿2) in extM￿ induce a probability
distribution over ￿ ￿ L ￿ H1 ￿ A and thus also conditional probability
distributions over A, given every l 2 L (i.e., a communication device).
Let CE(extM￿) be the set (￿ RjL1￿L2j) of all correlated equilibrium pay-
o⁄s of extM￿.
114 Implementing communication equilibria by
cheap talk
We are ready to state the main theorem:
Theorem 1 Let ￿ ￿ < fLi;Ai;gigi=1;2 ;p > be a two-person ￿nite Bayesian
game and q be a communication equilibrium of ￿ such that G[q] 2 SINTIR(￿).
There exist a ￿nite set of messages M and a correlated equilibrium of extM(￿),
the cheap talk extension of ￿ with messages in M, which induces the condi-
tional probability distribution q(:jl1;l2) over actions (i.e., over A1 ￿ A2) for
every pair of types (l1;l2) 2 L1￿L2; in particular, the payo⁄ of the correlated
equilibrium is G[q]. Moreover, the correlated equilibrium of extM(￿) is such
that cheap talk lasts for ￿nitely many stages almost surely.
In this statement, the set of messages depends on the parameters of ￿
and of q. If we allow for countably many messages, i.e., if we consider the
extended cheap talk game ext￿ in which M = N, we can get all strictly
individually rational communication equilibrium payo⁄s at once: ME(￿) \
SINTIR(￿) ￿ CE(ext￿). Recall that, by lemma 1, ME(￿) ￿ INTIR(￿);
the restriction imposed on communication equilibrium outcomes is thus a
relatively mild one. Conversely, by proceeding as in general versions of the
revelation principle, one can show that CE(ext￿) ￿ ME(￿). Hence we get
the following corollary:
Corollary 1 For any ￿nite two-person Bayesian game ￿,
ME(￿) \ SINTIR(￿) = CE(ext￿) \ SINTIR(￿)
Remark 1 Once N is the set of messages, cheap talk in ext￿ is described in
a universal way, i.e., independently of the underlying Bayesian game ￿, as in
Forges (1990b).
Remark 2 The previous corollary can be interpreted as a characterization
of the correlated equilibrium payo⁄s of the long cheap talk game ext￿, since
it states that CE(ext￿) and ME(￿) essentially coincide. Aumann and Hart
(2003) show that, even if only one of the players has private information in
￿ (if, e.g., jL2j = 1), the characterization of the Nash equilibrium payo⁄s of
the game ext￿ is fairly complex, as it relies on the martingales generated by
12the long cheap talk. On the contrary, most correlated equilibrium payo⁄s
of ext￿ are characterized in a tractable way, as communication equilibrium
payo⁄s of the original Bayesian game ￿.
Remark 3 Denoting the closure of CE(ext￿) as CE(ext￿), we deduce from
lemma 1 and corollary 1 that
CE(ext￿) = ME(￿)
The proof of theorem 1 is given in section 6. Before that, we propose an
example.
5 An example
We consider a variant of the ￿secret sharing￿problem, which is well-known
in computer science (see for instance Abraham et al. (2008)). We show that
the game has a communication equilibrium payo⁄ which cannot be achieved
as a correlated equilibrium payo⁄ of any extension of the game in which the
players talk for a given, ￿xed number of stages.
The secret sharing game ￿ will be derived from an auxiliary game ^ ￿, in
which both players have two possible types in S1 = S2 = f0;1g. Types are
chosen uniformly. Every player has two possible actions: A1 = A2 = f0;1g;
the payo⁄ functions gi : S1 ￿S2 ￿A1 ￿A2 ! R, i = 1;2, are summarized in
the following table:
g s2 0 1
s1 A 0 1 0 1
0 3;3 6;￿2 0;0 ￿2;6
0 1 ￿2;6 0;0 6;￿2 3;3
0 0;0 ￿2;6 3;3 6;￿2
1 1 6;￿2 3;3 ￿2;6 0;0
The interpretation is as follows : the secret is s = s1 + s2 (mod 2). Given
the secret s 2 f0;1g, the ￿right￿(resp., ￿wrong￿ ) action is to play according
to the secret, namely ai = s (resp., ai 6= s); both players have the same
preferences: being the only one to take the right action is preferred to both
taking the right action, which is preferred to both taking the wrong action,
which is itself preferred to being the only one to take the wrong action. In
13the game ^ ￿, the pair of expected payo⁄s (3;3) can only be achieved as a
completely revealing outcome, in which both players take the right action11.
But complete revelation cannot be achieved at a communication equilibrium
of ^ ￿: every player can gain in lying unilaterally about his type in order to
be the only one to take the right action.
Let us modify ^ ￿ into a more complex game ￿, in which the players can
certify their type to some extent. Such a certi￿cation will be achieved by
associating ￿codes￿with the types. Let E be a ￿nite set, containing at least
4 elements (the reason for this cardinality will be given later). The sets of
types in ￿ are Li = Si￿E￿E￿E, i = 1;2. Nature ￿rst makes the following
choices:
1. a pair (s1;s2) 2 S1 ￿ S2 is chosen uniformly as in ^ ￿




1) 2 E ￿ E are chosen uniformly





1 ), i = 1;2. The action sets and the
payo⁄ functions in ￿ are the same as in ^ ￿, in the sense that payo⁄s only
depend on the ￿rst coordinate of the types and on the actions.
The interpretation of the types in ￿ is that player i knows the code ei
si 2 E
of his type si but does not know the code of the other possible type he might
have. If he can talk to the other player j = ￿i and wants to reveal his type
si to him, he also sends the code ei
si, so that player j, who knows the code of
the two possible types of player i, namely, ei
0 and ei
1, can check that player
i￿ s reported type is consistent with the codes. If player i wants to lie on
his type, he has to guess the corresponding code, with a probability of 3
4 of
being detected by player j. Even if no communication device is available,
every player can detect a lie of the other with high probability, by checking
the codes, but this typically happens after that useful information has been
transmitted. The situation is very di⁄erent when there is a communication
device. In this case, the device does not release any information when it
detects cheating, which protects the honest player. This e⁄ect cannot be
simulated at a Nash equilibrium.
Let us show that the vector of conditional expected payo⁄s ((3;3);(3;3)) 2
ME(￿). For that, we describe a canonical communication device q : L !
11In order to see this, let q(:jl), l 2 L, be conditional probability distributions over
actions given types achieving the pair of expected payo⁄s (3;3) in the game ^ ￿. Every
q(:jl) is a distribution over the same payo⁄s f(0;0);(￿2;6);(3;3);(6;￿2)g, in which (3;3)
is an extreme point.




1 ) to the communi-
cation device q, which recommends then actions as follows:
1. if ei = "i
ri and ej = "
j
rj, q computes r = r1 + r2 (mod 2) and sets
a1 = a2 = r.
2. otherwise, q chooses an action pro￿le (a1;a2) uniformly.
Let us check that q de￿nes a communication equilibrium. Assume that






1 ). Suppose ￿rst that ri 6= si, namely that player i lies on
his component of the secret. He does not know the code ei
ri and will guess it
correctly with probability 1
4 (recall that the set of possible codes E contains
4 elements). In this case, the device recommends actions a1 = a2 = ri + sj;
by playing against the recommendation of the device, player i gets the high-
est possible payo⁄, 6. Otherwise, if player i does not guess ei
ri correctly,
the device selects actions uniformly, and player i can as well play against
the recommendation of the device. His total expected payo⁄ is 1
4 ￿ 6 + 3
4 ￿ ￿
1
4 ￿ 3 + 1
4 ￿ 6 + 1
4 ￿ (￿2)
￿
< 3. All other possible deviations of player i,
e.g., involving cheating in the other player￿ s codes, either give rise to a higher
probability of being detected and reduce his expected payo⁄, or have no ef-
fect on the payo⁄s. As we already observed above, while completely revealing
in terms of the original types (in S1 ￿ S2), the communication equilibrium
expected payo⁄ (3;3) cannot be achieved as a Nash equilibrium of a cheap
talk game like extM￿.
The vector of conditional expected payo⁄s ((3;3);(3;3)) is in SINTIR(￿):
by playing both actions with probability 1
2, independently of his type, player j
guarantees that player i = ￿j￿ s payo⁄does not exceed 7
4, whathever his type
and his action. Obviously, this punishment depends on the fact that player
i does not know player j￿ s share of the secret. By theorem 1, ((3;3);(3;3))
can thus be achieved as a correlated equilibrium of a long cheap talk game
extM￿, for some ￿nite set of messages M. We show below that in any ex-
tended cheap talk game in which the number of stages is ￿xed, the players
cannot reach ((3;3);(3;3)).
Let us ￿x an extension extT
M￿ of ￿ in which the cheap talk phase cannot
exceed T stages. Every stage t = 0;1;:::;T of extT
M￿ can be described as
in extM￿, for some set M of messages, but the moves in fc;sg are not
necessary: the game goes on for T + 1 stages, with ￿nal decisions at stage
15T + 1, whatever the history12. Let us assume that extT
M￿ has a correlated
equilibrium achieving the expected payo⁄ (3;3), namely complete revelation
of the secret. At the last stage T, both players must know the secret on
every possible history. Without loss of generality, this does not happen at
stage T ￿1, otherwise the deadline could be T ￿1. Thus, at the end of stage
T ￿ 1, there exists a history (call it hT￿1), which has positive probability
at equilibrium, for which at least one of the players, say player 1, does not
know the secret, namely, player 1￿ s posterior probability that player 2￿ s type
is 0 is not 0 or 1. Hence, on hT￿1, player 1 relies on player 2￿ s message at
stage T to learn the secret. Note that the history hT￿1 involves the choice
of the underlying correlation device, hence is not necessarily fully identi￿ed
by player 2. But player 2 can select his message uniformly, independently
of the past, at stage T. If player 2 deviates in this way (only at stage T),
while player 1 does not deviate, player 2 learns the secret at stage T, on
every possible history, while player 1 does not learn it at least on hT￿1. In
the next paragraph, we complete player 2￿ s deviation by describing how he
chooses his action and we show that his deviation is pro￿table.
At the end of stage T ￿ 1, player 2￿ s information consists of his type,
the private extraneous signal from the correlation device and the messages
exchanged at stages 1;:::;T ￿ 1. Given his information, player 2 determines
the message m2
T he should send at stage T as if he did not deviate. Since
there is no deviation at any stage 1;:::;T ￿1, player 1 sends his message m1
T
at stage T as in equilibrium. Even if player 2 deviates at stage T, he has
the same information, at the end of stage T, as when he does not deviate. In
particular, m1
T and m2
T are part of player 2￿ s information. We complete his
deviation as follows: after having sent his (uniformly selected) message e m2
T
to player 1 and having received player 1￿ s message m1
T, he chooses his action
in A2 according to his equilibrium strategy as if the messages at stage T were
(m1
T;m2
T). This guarantees him a payo⁄ strictly higher than 3 if the history
hT￿1 identi￿ed above occurs and no less than 3 otherwise. Hence player 2￿ s
deviation is pro￿table.
The constructive proof of theorem 1 avoids the obstacles of a bounded
cheap talk phase, by introducing extra uncertainty for the players about the
time at which they reveal their part of the secret to each other. In such a
construction, the number of conversation stages cannot be deterministically
bounded. Nevertheless, in equilibrium, the players stop talking with prob-
12Hence, on some histories, cheap talk may become vacuous from some stage on.
16ability one. The probability that a deviator can a⁄ect the conversation in
a way that it lasts forever can be made arbitrarily small. The main idea
is that, at every stage, player i, say, does not know whether he will receive
useful information from player j = ￿i in the following stage or not. Hence
player i may not have any incentive to send a message which di⁄ers from the
one prescribed by the correlation device. In particular, in our construction,
with large probability, a deviation of player i is detected by player j before
that player i learns the secret, so that player j can stop the conversation and
punish player i in the initial Bayesian game ￿, with prior p.
6 Proof of Theorem 1
Let us ￿x a communication equilibrium q of ￿, such that G[q] 2 SINTIR(￿).
We shall construct a set of messages M and a correlated equilibrium of extM￿
which satisfy the requirements of the theorem. The precise size of M will be
determined when we check the equilibrium conditions. We start by describing
a correlation device, namely a probability space (￿;B;￿), and private signals
for every player, namely sub-￿-algebras B1 and B2; then we de￿ne the players￿
strategies.
Items selected by the correlation device: (￿;B;￿)
We make a list of the items selected by the correlation device. Unless
speci￿ed otherwise, these items are selected uniformly in the ￿nite set to
which they belong and they are all selected independently of each other.
The correlation device selects:
1. for i = 1;2, a permutation ￿i of Li; let ￿ = (￿1;￿2) and ￿(l) =
(￿1(l1);￿2(l2)), for every l = (l1;l2) 2 L;
2. a stage t? 2 f2;3;:::g, according to a geometric distribution with suc-
cess parameter z > 0 to be speci￿ed later;
3. for every l 2 L, a pair of actions at?;￿(l) 2 A, according to q(:jl);
4. for every l 2 L and every t 2 f2;3;:::g, t 6= t?, a pair of actions
at;￿(l) 2 A;
5. for i = 1;2, every l 2 L and every t 2 f2;3;:::g, a permutation ￿
i
t;￿(l)





176. for i = 1;2, every l 2 L, every action bi 2 Ai and every t 2 f2;3;:::g, a
￿code￿ki(t;￿(l);bi) 2 M;
7. for i = 1;2 and every t 2 f2;3;:::g, a pair of ￿labels￿￿
i









t if t 6= t?;
8. for i = 1;2, every l 2 L, every t 2 f2;3;:::g and every label ￿ 2 M, a
￿code￿￿i(t;￿) 2 M.
To sum up, only t? in 1. and at?;￿(l), l 2 L, in 3. are selected according
to a speci￿c, non-uniform probability distribution. The stage t? is the only




t at stage t are
not independent from each other, nor from t. The parameter z represents the
probability that t? be the next stage; z and the size of M will be computed
at the end of the proof (see the expression (4) below).
Private extraneous information: Bi, i = 1;2.
The correlation device sends the following private signal13 to player i,
i = 1;2:
- the permutation ￿i of Li selected in 1.
- the permutations ￿
i
t;￿(l) of Ai, l 2 L, t 2 f2;3;:::g selected in 5.
- the (encrypted, recommended) actions (for the other player, ￿i) b
￿i
t;￿(l) 2
A￿i for every l 2 L, t 2 f2;3;:::g de￿ned in 5, together with their
associated code k￿i(t;￿(l);b
￿i
t;￿(l)) selected in 6.
- the code functions ki(t;￿(l);:) : Ai ! M for every l 2 L, t 2 f2;3;:::g,
selected in 6.
- the labels ￿
i
t, t 2 f2;3;:::g selected in 7., together with their associated
code ￿i(t;￿
i
t) selected in 8.
- the code functions (of the other player, ￿i) ￿￿i(t;:) : M ! M for every
t 2 f2;3;:::g, selected in 8.
13It is understood that functions over L = L1 ￿ L2 are described as L1 ￿ L2 tables, for
a given order on L1 and L2.























At this point, the description of the game (extM￿)￿ is complete.
Equilibrium strategies (￿1;￿2) in (extM￿)￿
We ￿rst give a rough description of the strategies (￿1;￿2) and of the
way in which they combine with each other. The basic idea is that the
geometric random variable t? describes the only relevant stage, in which
players determine the actions ai
t?;￿(l), i = 1;2, to be played in the Bayesian
game. For every l, the pair of actions at?;￿(l) selected in 3. is distributed
according to q(:jl). However, the players cannot fully reveal their types to
each other nor know more than their own action. Hence permutations are
applied both to the types (￿i, selected in 1.) and to the actions (￿
i
t?;￿(l),
selected in 5.). At stage 1, the players send hidden types, ￿i(li), i = 1;2, to
each other. At stage t?, every player i sends the message b
￿i
t?;￿(l) to the other
player. If player i indeed receives the message bi
t?;￿(l) from the other player,





the inverse of the permutation ￿
i
t?;￿(l), and this action will be distributed
as in the communication equilibrium. There remains to make every player
able to identify t?, only after having transmitted his recommended action
b
￿i
t?;￿(l) to the other player. This is the role of the labels selected in 7. By
construction, as in the communication equilibrium, player i will not gain by
pretending another type at stage 1 or deviating from his recommended action
ai
t?;￿(l). But player i must transmit a recommended action b
￿i
t?;￿(l) to the other
player, which has no counterpart in the communication equilibrium. This is
the role of the codes14 selected in 6. In order to prevent cheating in the labels,
further codes are needed, selected in 8. We detail the equilibrium strategies
in the next paragraph.
Given his private extraneous signal !i described above, player i￿ s equilib-
rium strategy in extM￿ is as follows:
14Restricted to two stages, t = 1 and t? chosen deterministically equal to 2, the corre-
lation device is a variant of the one used in Forges (1990b) in the case of three players.
19- at stage 1, player i chooses c; if both players select c, player i announces
￿i(li) if his type is li; otherwise, he plays a punishment action against
the other player and the game stops (recall that q is individually ra-
tional, so that player i can select a punishment15 according to some
yi(:jli) 2 ￿A￿i); let ￿(l) be the pair of announcements at the ￿rst
stage (if (c;c) was chosen).
- at stage 2, player i chooses c












- at stage 2, if (c;c) was not selected, player i punishes the other player, as
in stage 1.
- at every stage t ￿ 2, if (c;c) was selected, then, right after having re-
ceived the other player￿ s last message, player i checks whether the lat-



















If these equalities do not hold at stage t, player i stops the cheap
talk, that is, he chooses s at the beginning of stage t + 1 and plays a
punishment action against the other player as above.
- at every stage t ￿ 2, if (c;c) was selected, player i also checks whether
his label ￿
i





t . If yes, and no deviation was detected, player i
concludes that t = t?; he chooses to stop (namely, s) at the beginning
of stage t+1, the cheap talk ends and player i determines his action ai
by applying the inverse of the permutation ￿
i
t;￿(l) (which he received
from the correlation device) to the message bi









15To be consistent with our de￿nition of strategies in (extM￿)￿, in which all random-
izations are made by the correlation device, possible punishment strategies should in fact
be selected by the correlation device.
20- if, at the beginning of some stage t ￿ 3, player i chooses c but the other
player j (= ￿i) chooses s, player i punishes player j as above.
- should cheap talk last forever, di
1 (i = 1;2) could be de￿ned in an arbitrary
way.
To sum up, if both players follow the prescribed strategies, the conversa-
tion lasts for at least 2 stages. Stage 1 is the only stage where the players
send a type dependent message, but posteriors are not updated until stage





t, namely when t = t?; in this case, ￿nal decisions are
made at stage t? + 1.
In order to check that the prescribed strategies form an equilibrium in
the game (extM￿)￿, we assume for simplicity that player 2 does not devi-
ate in (extM￿)￿ and consider possible deviations of player 1. Let l1 be his
type and !1 be his extraneous signal, described as in (2). Since player 1￿ s
payo⁄ G1[q] is individually rational, he cannot bene￿t from choosing s at
the beginning of stage 1 of (extM￿)￿; let thus ￿1(^ l1) be his further message
at stage 1, with ^ l1 possibly di⁄erent from l1. We shall distinguish between
several deviations of player 1. We start with deviations which are already
feasible in the communication equilibrium and we show that they are un-
pro￿table, namely, that the correlated equilibrium of (extM￿)￿ ￿mimics￿the
communication equilibrium.
Equilibrium conditions: undetectable deviations
Let us assume that from stage 2 on, player 1 sends all his messages as
prescribed by his correlated strategy. More precisely, let t ￿ 2 be a stage t
at which the conversation is still going on. Given our current assumptions,




r for every stage r such that 2 ￿ r < t. At the
beginning of stage t, player 1 has not learnt anything on t?, player 2￿ s type nor
recommended actions, since all items that player 1 can interpret in !1 have
been selected uniformly (this holds in particular for every action b2
t;￿1(^ l1);￿2(l2),
including b2
t?;￿1(^ l1);￿2(l2), which is obtained by applying a random permutation
to a2
t;￿1(^ l1);￿2(l2)). Furthermore, at the beginning of stage t, given !1 and
the sequence of moves in (extM￿)￿ up to stage t (including his ￿rst move
￿1(^ l1)), player 1 anticipates that the pair of actions to be determined (but






t?;￿1(^ l1);￿2(l2)) = a
i
t?;￿1(^ l1);￿2(l2) i = 1;2 (3)
21By construction, given player 1￿ s information at the beginning of stage t, this
pair of actions is distributed according to q(:j^ l1;l2). To sum up, if player 2
does not deviate and player 1 of type l1 sends ￿1(^ l1) at the ￿rst stage and
all his other messages as prescribed, the actions computed by the players at
stage t?, namely (3), are distributed exactly as the actions recommended by
the communication device q when player 1￿ s reported type is ^ l1 and player
2￿ s type is l2. Hence player 1 will not deviate at the ￿rst stage by lying on
his type and/or at t? +1 by choosing another action than the one computed
in (3).
The previous paragraph also shows that, if both players follow the pre-
scribed strategies at every stage, the conditional probability distribution over
actions (i.e., over A1 ￿ A2) given types (l1;l2) 2 S1 ￿ S2 is q(:jl1;l2); in par-
ticular, the expected payo⁄s are G[q].
We consider further possible deviations of player 1.
Equilibrium conditions: deviations which are detectable with high probability
Let l1, !1 and ^ l1 be as above. As already observed for stage 1, if player 2
does not deviate, player 1 cannot gain in sending his messages as prescribed
and choosing s at the beginning of a stage at which he should choose c, since
his payo⁄ G1[q] is individually rational.
As above, let us consider a stage t at which the conversation is still going
on; assume that player 1 does not send (at least one of) the precribed vari-
ables b2
t;￿1(^ l1);￿2(l2) and ￿
1
t in his message to player 2. Then, since the codes are




t), will be incorrect with probability (at least) 1￿1=jMj, in which
case player 2 will detect an inconsistency, stop the conversation and choose





t, player 1 will not have learnt anything; in particular his probabil-
ity distribution over L2 will still be p(:jl1). In this case, player 2 can pick
the strategy y2(:jl2) in such a way that player 1￿ s payo⁄ does not exceed
G1[qjl1]￿￿, for some ￿ > 0, since G1[q] is strictly individually rational in the





so that t = t?, player 1 acquires new information; the e⁄ect of the ￿pun-
ishment￿strategy becomes unclear, except for the fact that player 1￿ s payo⁄
cannot exceed the largest possible payo⁄ in the game ￿, which we denote
by ￿. Finally, if player 1￿ s deviation is not detected, his payo⁄ can also be
bounded by ￿ (in this case, the conversation could be in￿nite). By recalling
22that, at every stage t at which the game has not yet stopped, the probability
that t = t? is z, we compute the following upper bound on player 1￿ s payo⁄
G1




1) ￿ (1 ￿ 1=jMj)(z￿ + (1 ￿ z)(G
1[qjl
1] ￿ ￿)) + ￿=jMj (4)
If the set M of messages16 is large enough and the probability z > 0 is small







We have thus shown that the correlated strategies described above form an
equilibrium of the game (extM￿)￿ which achieves the conditional probability
distributions q(:jl) of the communication equilibrium, in particular, the payo⁄
G[q]. At equilibrium, given the geometric distribution of t?, the conversation
ends with probability one. ￿
7 Discussion: variants of the model
We start with a variant of the strategic form correlated equilibria considered
up to now. Then we consider two particular cases in which theorem 1 takes
a much simpler form. Finally, we address questions mostly motivated by
Ben-Porath (2003, 2006).
7.1 Extensive form correlated equilibria
The proof of theorem 1 makes use of typical correlation devices for the long
cheap talk game extM￿, which select, before the beginning of game, an in-
￿nite sequence of extraneous signals to be used gradually by the players.
The corresponding correlated equilibria can be denoted as ￿strategic form
correlated equilibria￿ . What if the players do not have access to (or can-
not generate17) in￿nite sequence of correlated extraneous signals, at once,
16The bound (4) re￿ ects the required size of M as far as codes are concerned. The set
M should of course be also large enough to contain the other messages to be transmitted





17Players can simulate ￿nite correlation devices by themselves by using simple machines
(like Turing machines, see Dodis, Halevy and Rabin (2000) and Urbano and Vila (2002))
or the AND signalling function (see Vida (2007b)).
23at the beginning of the game? One could then consider extensive form, au-
tonomous correlation devices which send one private signal to every player
at every stage of extM￿ (see Forges (2006) and Myerson (2006, 1991)). Such
devices generate sunspots every day. They are independent of the cheap talk
game, in the sense that they do not receive any input from the players and
do not get any information on the players￿messages. They thus preserve the
players￿privacy. The previous proof shows that theorem 1 still holds if ￿cor-
related equilibrium￿is replaced by ￿extensive form, autonomous correlated
equilibrium using ￿nitely many signals at every stage￿ . Corollary 1 also holds
for the set g CE(ext￿) of extensive form, autonomous correlated equilibrium
payo⁄s, since CE(ext￿) ￿ g CE(ext￿) ￿ ME(￿).
7.2 Sender-Receiver games
As a particular case, let us assume that only player 1 possesses private in-
formation (jL2j = 1) and that only player 2 makes a decision (jA1j = 1).
Under these asumptions, the cheap talk game becomes a ￿sender-receiver￿
game, in which the length of the players￿conversation is not ￿xed in advance
(as in, e.g., Forges (1990a), Aumann and Hart (2003)18, Forges and Koessler
(2008)). We shall deduce from the proof of theorem 1 that t? can be chosen
in a deterministic way, as t? = 1. Let us set L = L1 and A = A2 and let us
consider a correlation device as above, which selects the following items
1. a permutation ￿ of L;
2. for every l 2 L, an action a￿(l) 2 A, according to q(:jl);
3. for every l 2 L, a permutation ￿￿(l) of A; let us set b￿(l) = ￿￿(l)(a￿(l));
4. for every l 2 L and every action b 2 A, a ￿code￿k(￿(l);b) 2 M;
The correlation device transmits
to player 1: ￿ and (b￿(l);k(￿(l);b￿(l)))l2L
to player 2: (￿￿(l);k(￿(l);:))l2L
Given the signal from the correlation device and his type l, player 1￿ s equi-
librium strategy is to send ￿(l), b￿(l) and k(￿(l);b￿(l)) to player 2 at a single
18Aumann and Hart (2003) assume one sided private information, namely, jL2j = 1, but
allow both players to make decisions.
24stage of information transmission. Given his private signal (￿￿(l);k(￿(l);:))l2L
and player 1￿ s message (^ l;b;m), player 2 checks whether the code is correct,
namely that m = k(^ l;b); if it is the case, he chooses the action (￿^ l)￿1(b);
otherwise he chooses his action according to q(:jl), for some arbitrary l 2 L.
By proceeding as above, one shows that these correlated strategies form an
equilibrium, which is equivalent to the communication equilibrium q. Forges
(1985, lemma 2) establishes a slightly stronger result, namely that every com-
munication equilibrium payo⁄ (even not in SINTIR(￿)) can be achieved as
a correlated equilibrium payo⁄ of the cheap talk game. As already pointed
out, Blume (2010) proves an analog in Crawford and Sobel (1982)￿ s model.
7.3 Uniform punishments
The proof of theorem 1 simpli￿es dramatically if the communication equilib-
rium payo⁄ of ￿ to be achieved as a correlated equilibrium payo⁄ of extM￿
belongs to SINTIR(￿) for every prior probability distribution p in ￿. This
happens for instance if ￿ has a ￿bad outcome￿that every player can enforce,
whatever the types.
More precisely, let ￿
1, ￿





i for every i = 1;2; l 2 L; a
i 2 A
i
and, recalling expression (1), let G[q] = (Gi[qjli]li2Li)i=1;2 2 ME(￿) be such
that Gi[qjli] > ￿
i, i = 1;2. Then G[q] 2 SINTIR(￿), for every p 2 ￿L. In
the proof of theorem 1, to achieve G[q] as a payo⁄ in CE(extM￿), t? can be
chosen in a deterministic way, as t? = 2. The correlation device can dispense
with selecting the labels and all items associated with t > 2. Indeed, if player
i￿ s code k￿i(2;￿(l);b
￿i
2;￿(l)) at stage 2 is not correct, player ￿i can punish him
by playing the action b￿i guaranteeing that player i￿ s payo⁄ does not exceed
￿
i, independently of the information that player i may have acquired at stage
2. However, in many interesting situations, it is impossible to punish a player,
when he has obtained further information, in a way that would deter him
from cheating in transmitting his own information. This is exactly what
happens in the example of section 5: once a player knows the secret, there is
no way to punish him strictly below his communication equilibrium payo⁄.
The next remarks are specially motivated by questions raised in Ben-
Porath (2003, 2006).
257.4 Credible punishments
The punishment strategies used in the proof of theorem 1 may not be cred-
ible, in the sense that they are akin to minmax strategies. An easy way to
guarantee credible punishments is to focus on communication equilibrium
payo⁄s that are not only strictly individually rational, but even dominate a
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. Ben-Porath (2003) studies the implementation
of such particular communication equilibria in Bayesian games with three
players or more.
Recalling (1), let us consider payo⁄s G[q] = (Gi[qjli]li2Li)i=1;2 2 ME(￿)
for which there exist (possibly equal) Bayesian-Nash equilibrium payo⁄s x1 =
(xi
1(li)li2Li)i=1;2 and x2 = (xi






i) for every i = 1;2 and l
i 2 L
i.
Then, in the proof of theorem 1, when player i deviates in a detectable way,
the other player can punish him by playing the Nash equilibrium strategy
associated with the payo⁄ xi (i = 1;2).
Observe that such a punishment reaches its goal because in our proof,
when a deviation is detected, the probability distribution over types is, with
arbitrarily high probability, the prior p. Credible punishments are of course
not necessarily uniform punishments (see Ben-Porath (2006)).
Observe also that we do not require that x1 and x2 coincide. In theorem
1 of Ben-Porath (2003), the communication equilibrium payo⁄ to be imple-
mented by cheap talk is required to dominate the same Bayesian Nash for
all players (and all types). Such an assumption can be useful in games with
more than two players, because the identi￿cation of a deviating player can
then be an issue.
7.5 ￿Cheap talk￿with delayed messages
The terminology ￿cheap talk￿has been used to cover more or less sophisti-
cated forms of communication between the players. In this paper, we just
allow the players to talk for as long as they like by sending simultaneous
messages to each other. BÆrÆny (1992) and Ben-Porath (2006) consider more
￿ exible procedures, like the safe recording, at some stage t, of a message that
can possibly be released at some further stage t0, as a function of the history
at stage t0.
26If such a relaxed form of cheap talk is allowed in the framework of the
current paper, the proof of theorem 1 can easily be modi￿ed so as to achieve
every payo⁄in ME(￿)\SINTIR(￿) with only four stages of cheap talk. To
see this, let us slightly modify the correlation device of the proof of theorem
1 by chosing t? uniformly in some ￿nite set T and interpreting it as an
index (rather than a stage). At the ￿rst stage of cheap talk, the players
exchange information ￿(l) on their types as before. Then every player i
secretly prepares jTj envelopes, with envelope t containing the encrypted
recommended action b
￿i
t;￿(l) of the other player, its code k￿i(t;￿(l);b
￿i
t;￿(l)) and
player i￿ s code function ki(t;￿(l);:). At the second stage of cheap talk, the





t);￿￿i(t;:))t2T ). If no deviation is detected at this stage,
they identify the index t?. At the third stage of ￿cheap talk￿ , they reveal to
each other the content of all envelopes with index t 6= t? and check that the
codes are consistent. If again no deviation is detected, they open the two
envelopes with index t?.
The conclusion from this exercise is that allowing delayed messages in
cheap talk is by no means innocuous. Indeed, in section 5, we have exhibited
a communication equilibrium payo⁄which cannot be achieved as a correlated
equilibrium payo⁄ of any game in which cheap talk lasts for a ￿xed number
of stages and does not involve any delayed message.
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